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Note
Confronting Victims: Why the Statements of
Young Victims of Heinous Crimes Must Still Be
Subject to Cross-Examination
Joseph Meyer*
Orlando Manuel Bobadilla does not make a very sympathetic defendant: he was charged with first-degree sexual as1
sault of a three-year-old boy. At his trial, Bobadilla was identified by statements that the victim gave to a child-protection
2
social worker during a previous interview. However, because of
a Minnesota statute that allows out-of-court statements of
child-victims to be used in court, Bobadilla never had an oppor3
tunity to cross-examine the victim. The well-intentioned statute was designed to protect child-victims of these sorts of offenses from being further traumatized by having to face their
abusers in court. But it meant that Bobadilla could not ask the
victim questions to establish the certainty of the identification
or to pose any questions regarding a motive to lie, improper in4
fluence, or confusion. Rather than having the jury assess the
victim’s credibility, the judge alone decided that the victim’s
5
statements bore sufficient “indicia of reliability.” While the defendant was unable to challenge the identifying party’s assertions, Bobadilla was also not allowed to attempt to prove his
* J.D. Candidate 2014, M.B.A. 2013, University of Minnesota. I would
like to thank the staff and editors of the Minnesota Law Review, especially
Emily Peterson, Morgan Helme, and Jacob Rhein, for all of the editorial support that has gone into this Note. Additionally, I would like to thank Craig
Roen, Adjunct Professor of Law at the University of Minnesota Law School, for
his guidance on topic selection and his feedback on numerous drafts of this
Note. Finally, for a lifetime of love and support, I would like to thank Pat Foster, Charles Meyer, Lisa Meyer, Rachel Hoffart, and T.J. Houk. Copyright
© 2014 by Joseph Meyer.
1. State v. Bobadilla, 709 N.W.2d 243, 246 (Minn. 2006).
2. Id. at 247–48.
3. Id. at 248.
4. See id.
5. See id. at 256.
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innocence by offering evidence of his own consistent denials be6
cause that would be impermissible hearsay. The jury subsequently found Bobadilla guilty, and he was sentenced to twelve
7
years in prison for first-degree criminal sexual conduct.
As a general principle, the right of a defendant like Bobadilla to confront the witnesses against him is guaranteed by the
Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution. The Sixth Amendment provides that “[i]n all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be con8
fronted with the witnesses against him.” A number of states
have passed statutes carving out exceptions for child-victims of
certain violent offenses when a judge determines that the
9
statements meet some standard of reliability. These statutes
were consistent with the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Ohio v. Roberts so long as there was either a showing
that the witness was “unavailable” or that the statements bore
10
“adequate indicia of reliability.” However, in 2004, the Supreme Court overturned Roberts in Crawford v. Washington,
holding that all so-called “testimonial” statements (in other
words, witness statements obtained for the purpose of prosecuting the accused) in criminal cases requires that the defendant
11
not be deprived of his right to cross-examination. Furthermore, the statutes are problematic because the jury, and not
the judge, is responsible for assessing the credibility of evi12
dence.
6. Id. at 256–57.
7. Id. at 246.
8. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
9. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013) (providing that “[a]n
out-of-court statement made by a child under the age of ten years . . . alleging,
explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual conduct or penetration
performed with or on the child” will be admissible “as substantive evidence”
even if otherwise prohibited provided that the child either testifies or “is unavailable as a witness and there is corroborative evidence of the act”); WIS.
STAT. § 908.08(3) (2012) (requiring that the “time, content and circumstances
of the statement provide indicia of its trustworthiness”).
10. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
11. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51–52, 68–69 (2004)
(“Where testimonial statements are at issue, the only indicium of reliability
sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
12. See MANUAL OF MODEL CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS FOR THE DIST.
COURTS OF THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT § 3.04 (Jud. Comm. on Model Jury Instructions for the Eighth Circuit, rev. ed. 2013) [hereinafter EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL] (“In deciding what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony
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This Note will discuss the implications of Crawford and its
progeny for these so-called victim protection statutes. Part I
discusses the current state of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, as well as policy considerations behind laws shielding
children from having to testify in certain types of cases. Part II
analyzes how those laws are inconsistent with both the Confrontation Clause as well as the role of the jury as fact-finder.
Ultimately, Part III of this Note proposes that the offending
statutes should be revised to make them consistent with the
Supreme Court’s Crawford line of decisions either by providing
for live, two-way video testimony or by limiting the scope of the
statutes.
I. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE
This Part outlines the Ohio v. Roberts decision, which provided the guidelines for admitting hearsay evidence against
criminal defendants. It goes on to show how one United States
Supreme Court case turned Confrontation Clause jurisprudence on its head. Finally, it demonstrates how courts have
dealt with statutes addressing out-of-court testimony of childvictims and discusses the role of the jury as fact-finder in trials.
A. OHIO V. ROBERTS
In 1980, in Roberts, the United States Supreme Court issued a landmark ruling in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
The Court considered whether hearsay evidence may be admit13
ted against a criminal defendant. In that case, a man named
14
Herschel Roberts was charged with check forgery. Roberts
claimed that Anita Isaacs, an acquaintance of the defendant,
allowed him to use her parents’ checkbook. Roberts was convicted largely based on transcripts made when defense counsel
questioned Isaacs at a preliminary hearing and she contradict15
ed Roberts’s claims. The Court held that the Confrontation
Clause bears upon hearsay in two ways. First, the framers
16
showed a preference for face-to-face confrontation. Second, in
you believe and what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of
what a witness said, or only part of it, or none of it.”).
13. See Roberts, 448 U.S. at 62–63.
14. Id. at 58.
15. Id. at 58–60.
16. See id. at 65 (“In the usual case (including cases where prior crossexamination has occurred), the prosecution must either produce, or demonstrate the unavailability of, the declarant whose statement it wishes to use
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the event that a witness is unavailable, hearsay evidence can
17
only be used if it bears some indicia of reliability. “Reliability
can be inferred . . . where the evidence falls within a firmly
rooted hearsay exception. In other cases, the evidence must be
excluded . . . absent . . . particularized guarantees of trustwor18
thiness.” The Roberts Court concluded that judges (and not
the jury) would be responsible for determining whether there
were sufficient indicia of reliability in order to weigh the evi19
dence.
B. CONFRONTATION CLAUSE: CRAWFORD AND AFTER
Roberts did not stand forever, though, as the Supreme
Court made a decision that significantly altered the landscape
of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence. Tremors caused by that
decision were felt almost immediately.
1. Crawford
Twenty-four years after Roberts, the United States Supreme Court reexamined the Confrontation Clause and its application to out-of-court statements offered at trial for prosecution purposes. In Crawford v. Washington, defendant Michael
Crawford was charged with stabbing the man who attempted to
20
rape his wife, Sylvia. At trial, the prosecution played a recorded pretrial statement of Sylvia because marital privilege would
21
have precluded her from testifying in court. Crawford was
22
subsequently convicted. The Supreme Court held that using
Sylvia Crawford’s transcript against her husband violated the
23
Confrontation Clause. Justice Scalia observed that previous
rationales applied by the Court had been unfaithful to the hisagainst the defendant.” (citing Mancusi v. Stubbs, 408 U.S. 204 (1972); Barber
v. Page, 390 U.S. 719 (1968))).
17. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65–66 (allowing for certain hearsay evidence to be
admitted when the circumstances around the collecting of the evidence establish the truth of the hearsay and therefore do not prejudice the defense when
the defense is unable to cross-examine the witness); see also Mattox v. United
States, 156 U.S. 237, 244 (1895) (holding that evidence resting on such a solid
foundation ensures that the defense still receives the “substance of the constitutional protection”).
18. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
19. See id.
20. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 38 (2004).
21. Id. at 38–40.
22. Id. at 41.
23. Id. at 68.
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torical underpinnings of Confrontation rights. While Roberts
had focused on historically recognized hearsay exceptions and
indicia of reliability, the Crawford Court asserted that use of
“indicia of reliability” is inconsistent with the spirit of the Con25
frontation Clause. Against this backdrop, the Court held that
the Confrontation Clause was not subordinate to rules of evidence and a judge’s subjective assessment of whether the evi26
dence bore “indicia of reliability.” The Court held that states
could develop their own hearsay laws to deal with so-called
non-testimonial evidence, but that all testimonial hearsay
would be inadmissible as a matter of law when offered against
27
a criminal defendant. Under this ruling, for the Confrontation
Clause to be implicated under Crawford, there would have to
be a showing that the declarant was not testifying and that the
28
statements were testimonial. In a foreshadowing of the confusion that was to ensue as a result of the Supreme Court’s distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial hearsay, Justice Scalia stated that “[w]e leave for another day any effort to
29
spell out a comprehensive definition of ‘testimonial.’” The
court did give some limited guidance as to what constituted
“testimonial” hearsay: it included (1) ex parte in-court testimony, (2) formalized extrajudicial statements, and (3) statements
30
made to be a substitute for in-court testimony. The Court also
enumerated several types of hearsay which are always testi24. Id. at 60.
25. Id. The Court’s objections to the Roberts test were twofold. First, the
test is too broad because it “applies the same mode of analysis whether or not
the hearsay consists of ex parte testimony. This often results in close constitutional scrutiny in cases that are far removed from the core concerns of the
Clause.” Id. Second, the test is too narrow because it “admits statements
that do consist of ex parte testimony upon a mere finding of reliability.” Id.
26. Id. at 61–62. Justice Scalia used scathing language to criticize the use
of such indicia, stating that “[d]ispensing with confrontation because testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial because a defendant is obviously guilty. This is not what the Sixth Amendment prescribes.”
Id. at 62.
27. Id. at 68 (“Where nontestimonial hearsay is at issue, it is wholly consistent with the Framers’ design to afford the States flexibility in their development of hearsay law—as does Roberts, and as would an approach that exempted such statements from Confrontation Clause scrutiny altogether.
Where testimonial evidence is at issue, however, the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law required: unavailability and a prior opportunity
for cross-examination.”).
28. See id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 51–52.
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monial: “Whatever else the term covers, it applies at a minimum to prior testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a
31
grand jury, or at a former trial; and to police interrogations.”
2. Crawford’s Progeny

32

Two years later, in Davis v. Washington, the United States
Supreme Court had an opportunity to shed further light on
what was meant by the word “testimonial.” In that case, Adrian
Davis was charged with violating a protective order against his
33
ex-girlfriend. Some of the most damaging evidence against
34
him was a recording of his ex-girlfriend’s 911 call. The Court
articulated a standard for distinguishing between testimonial
and non-testimonial hearsay statements: “Statements are
nontestimonial when made in the course of police interrogation
under circumstances objectively indicating that the primary
purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assistance to
35
meet an ongoing emergency.” The Court went on to hold that
statements are testimonial when “the circumstances objectively
indicate that there is no such ongoing emergency, and that the
primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish or prove
36
past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.”
In Davis, the Court found that the 911 operator was gathering
facts from the witness to deal with the emergency rather than
37
fact-finding about past events in order to prove a charge. By
contrast, the Court found that statements identifying a defendant to law enforcement officials in a companion case, Hammon
38
39
v. State, were inadmissible. These statements were testimo-

31. Id. at 68.
32. Several cases interpreting Crawford were not included in this Note
because they were not germane to the arguments made within it. See, e.g.,
Williams v. Illinois, 132 S. Ct. 2221 (2012); Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts,
557 U.S. 305 (2009); Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008).
33. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 818 (2006).
34. Id. at 817–19.
35. Id. at 822.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 827–28.
38. Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444, 457 (Ind. 2005), rev’d sub nom. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006).
39. Davis, 547 U.S. at 832 (finding that it was immaterial that the statements in Hammon were in response to initial inquiries made at the crime scene because they were “neither a cry for help nor the provision of information
enabling officers immediately to end a threatening situation”).
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nial because they were made after the emergency was over.
The Davis Court then remanded Hammon for another trial
41
without the inadmissible evidence.
In 2011, in Michigan v. Bryant, the Court again had to
clarify what made statements testimonial. In that case, a man
named Richard Bryant was found guilty of murder after he was
identified by a dying declaration that his victim made to po42
lice. The Court stated it would use an “objective” standard to
assess the purpose of a statement by examining the surrounding circumstances to decide what a reasonable person would
43
understand the purpose of the question to be. In a departure
from the Crawford discussion, which included in its definition
of “testimonial” statements those statements where the intent
of the person answering the question is to create a substitute
44
for in-court testimony, this decision seemed to focus on the
45
primary purpose of the police in obtaining the statement. After applying that standard to the case, the Supreme Court
found the victim was primarily helping police respond to the
46
ongoing emergency rather than aiding a later prosecution.
In that same year, the Supreme Court again examined the
47
Confrontation Clause in Bullcoming v. New Mexico. Donald
Bullcoming was charged with driving while intoxicated and
40. Id. The Court also approved Hammon’s dicta that a 911 interrogation
innocently begun can “evolve into testimonial statements.” Id. at 828 (quoting
Hammon, 829 N.E.2d at 457) (internal quotation marks omitted).
41. Id. at 834.
42. Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1150 (2011).
43. Id. at 1156. The standard by which the purpose is measured is an objective standard. Id. It can be derived from the circumstances including the
time, location, and questions asked, but it is based on what a reasonable person would understand the purposes of the questioner to be and not on the actual subjective intent of the questioner. Id. One of the most important factors
to be considered when assessing the primary purpose is whether or not there
is an ongoing emergency that the police are responding to. Id. at 1157. An ongoing emergency can expand beyond threats to the witness and extend to other potential victims and responders. Id. at 1158. Another important question
is the formality of the setting. Id. at 1160. A formal setting will almost always
suggest the absence of an ongoing emergency, but an informal setting is not
enough to suggest the absence of an emergency. Id. The content of the discussion can also be probative of the purpose of the questioning. Id. at 1160–61.
Considering that a severely injured victim may have no purpose in answering
the questions is permissible and does not mean that the Court is conducting a
subjective inquiry. Id. at 1161.
44. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004).
45. See Bryant, 131 S. Ct. at 1155.
46. Id. at 1166–67.
47. Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2710 (2011).
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convicted largely because of a forensic laboratory report show48
ing his blood-alcohol concentration levels. The test was performed by an analyst named Caylor, but the State called a different analyst to validate the report during trial because Caylor
49
was on unpaid leave. The Court, relying in part on the understanding that the lab report was made in a formal setting,
found that admitting the report without the maker testifying
50
violated Bullcoming’s Confrontation Clause rights. The Court
found that the State had failed to establish that unpaid leave
51
made Caylor truly “unavailable.” Justice Sotomayor concurred, finding that the formality of the statement was probative of testimonial hearsay, and that the report therefore
should not have been admitted, because it was an attempt to
get into evidence hearsay obtained by law enforcement for the
52
purpose of prosecuting the defendant. Any time something is
created for that purpose, according to the Court’s precedents, it
53
is testimonial by nature.
These cases have left ambiguity as to what it means for
hearsay to be testimonial. The Davis Court did focus on three
factors to consider when deciding whether a statement is testimonial: (1) whether the focus is on past or present events, (2)
whether the purpose of the statement was to aid in the investi54
gation of a crime, and (3) the formality of the statements.
However, despite these factors, there is still ambiguity as to
what kind of hearsay may be constitutionally admitted.
C. STATE STATUTES INTENDED TO PROTECT CHILD-VICTIMS
FROM THE TRAUMA OF CONFRONTING THEIR ABUSERS
Many states have laws that allow law enforcement interviews with child-victims of certain crimes to be admitted with55
out subjecting the victims to cross-examination. Many of these
laws require that the victim be a child below a certain cutoff
48. Id. at 2709.
49. Id. at 2710–12.
50. Id. at 2717 (pointing out that the certificate Caylor created and signed
was part of a formal process that is suggestive of testimonial evidence).
51. Id. at 2714.
52. Id. at 2720–21 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
53. Id. at 2721 (“I am compelled to conclude that the report has a ‘primary
purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony,’ which renders it testimonial.” (citation omitted) (quoting Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct.
1143, 1155 (2011))).
54. See Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 826–27 (2006).
55. See supra note 9.

2416

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[98:2408

age, that the crime be a certain category of assault or sexual
abuse, and that the circumstances of the statements give some
56
indication of the trustworthiness of the testimony. These laws
admitting allegations of criminal behavior have their roots in
the common law, when prompt complaints of criminal conduct
were admissible as part of the “hue and cry” requirement of vio57
lent crimes. The law assumed that if a person really was an
unwilling victim of a violent crime, then the victim would
58
promptly report the offense.
This section will describe the state of these statutes in
Minnesota, Wisconsin, and California and will also discuss the
role of the jury in assessing witness credibility. Minnesota,
Wisconsin, and California are used as examples of these laws
59
because they are similar to laws that other states have and
also illustrate the different forms that the laws can take.
1. Minnesota’s Statute
Minnesota law provides that “[a]n out-of-court statement
made by a child under the age of ten years . . . alleging, explaining, denying, or describing any act of sexual conduct or penetration performed with or on the child” will be admissible “as
substantive evidence,” even if otherwise prohibited, provided
that the child either testifies or “is unavailable as a witness
60
and there is corroborative evidence of the act.”
Minnesota courts addressed the statute several times after
61
Roberts but before Crawford. In State v. Bellotti, for example,
Anthony Bellotti appealed from his conviction of sexually as62
saulting two girls. The Minnesota Court of Appeals addressed
whether a child’s out-of-court statements to a doctor in a hospital about Bellotti’s conduct were admissible in a second-degree
63
criminal sexual conduct case. This case provides a good exam56. See supra note 9.
57. Charles W. Ehrhardt & Ryon M. McCabe, Child Sexual Abuse Prosecutions: Admitting Out-of-Court Statements of Child Victims and Witnesses in
Louisiana, 23 S.U. L. REV. 1, 14 (1995).
58. See id.
59. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 92.53(1) (2014) (allowing for videotaped statements of victims under age sixteen to be used as a substitute for in-court testimony).
60. MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013).
61. See, e.g., State v. Cole, 594 N.W.2d 197, 198–99 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999);
State v. Hollander, 590 N.W.2d 341, 345–48 (Minn. Ct. App. 1999).
62. State v. Bellotti, 383 N.W.2d 308, 310 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
63. Id. at 310–11.
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ple of how Minnesota courts measure the indicia of reliability.
The following factors were considered: opportunity to commit
the crime, absence of a motive for the victims to lie, spontaneity
of the statements, absence of a long interrogation or leading
questions, use of age appropriate terminology by the victim, reluctance to speak with men about the crime, consistency of the
statements, spontaneity of the initial disclosure, length of time
between the assault and the statement to the police, and if the
64
victim agrees with everything asked of her. The court applied
the test articulated in Roberts and found that, by virtue of being declared incompetent, the witness was unavailable and
65
there were indicia of reliability. In a very short discussion, the
66
court found the statute facially constitutional. However, the
court’s finding of facial constitutionality is of little consequence
now because this case did not consider the more recent Crawford decision prohibiting testimonial hearsay.
In Bobadilla v. Carlson, discussed in the Introduction of
this Note and decided after Crawford, a federal district court in
Minnesota assessed whether it was a constitutional violation to
admit a videotaped statement given by a child-victim to a social
67
worker working at the behest of a police officer. The court
found that statements taken during the course of police interrogations were testimonial by definition and therefore per se
68
inadmissible as hearsay. This holding is in direct conflict with
the language of the statute that would leave it to the court to
determine the admissibility of such a testimonial statement,
even absent the opportunity to cross-examine the witness.
Therefore, the statute should be found to be facially unconstitutional.
2. Wisconsin’s Statute
Wisconsin has a similar statute that allows for a court to
“admit into evidence the audiovisual recording of an oral
69
statement of a child who is available to testify.” The statute
64. Id. at 312–13.
65. Id. at 315.
66. Id. at 314–15.
67. Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1099–100 (D. Minn. 2008).
68. Id. at 1104 (“[T]he Supreme Court was absolutely clear that
‘[s]tatements taken by police officers in the course of interrogations’ are ‘testimonial’ and cannot be admitted unless the declarant is unavailable and the
defendant has had an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant.” (quoting
Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 52 (2004))).
69. WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012).
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uses similar “indicia of reliability” language when it allows for
a court to determine whether “the time, content and circumstances of the statement provide indicia of its trustworthi70
ness.”
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals examined the statute’s
constitutionality in the pre-Crawford decision State v. Taranti71
no. In that case, Louis Tarantino appealed his conviction for
72
sexually assaulting his three stepdaughters. The evidence
against Tarantino included audiovisual recorded testimony of
73
the three victims from a pre-trial hearing. On its face, the
case does not implicate Crawford, as the defense had the opportunity to cross-examine the victim-witnesses at the pre-trial
hearing and at trial under the Wisconsin statute, even though
74
the state did not pursue direct examination at trial. Tarantino
75
appealed both the facial constitutionality of the statute as
well as the constitutionality of the trial court’s application of
76
that statute.
Nevertheless, Tarantino alleged that his due process rights
77
were violated. He argued that since the state was not required
to produce the children for live direct examination, his ability
to cross-examine them as guaranteed by the Confrontation
clause was conditioned upon compelling the child victimwitnesses to appear in court, something which would hurt him
78
in the eyes of the jury. The court was not persuaded by this
argument. It found that the built-in cross-examination proce79
dures “satisfie[d] substantive due process.” The court further
pointed out that there were other examples of hearsay excep80
tions when the declarant was available. However, Tarantino
was decided fourteen years before Crawford overturned many
81
of those exceptions.
70. Id. § 908.08(2)(d).
71. State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
72. Id. at 584.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 585.
75. Id. at 587–89.
76. Id. at 589–90.
77. Id. at 588.
78. Id. He asserted that the choice between not being able to crossexamine the witnesses and looking unsympathetic to the victims by calling
them as witnesses “place[d] him in a Catch-22.” Id.
79. Id. at 589.
80. Id.
81. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
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Tarantino also argued that since the testimony came from
a pretrial hearing where the burden of proof was probable
cause and the credibility of the witnesses could not be challenged, the court had impermissibly lowered the state’s burden
82
of proof from beyond a reasonable doubt to probable cause.
The court found the instruction telling the jury that they must
find the defendant guilty “beyond a reasonable doubt” in order
to convict was sufficient to address any burden of proof issues
83
raised by the defendant.
In the year before Crawford, in State v. Snider, that same
84
statute again came before the Wisconsin Court of Appeals.
Robert Snider appealed his conviction of first-degree sexual as85
sault of a child. In an interview with a social worker recorded
86
by a detective, the child-victim recounted the assault. At trial,
the state decided to use the recording after the victim-witness
failed to recount the events in the same level of detail while on
the stand as in the recording and omitted some important de87
tails. Snider argued that the admission of the video was im88
proper. The court upheld the trial court’s finding that “the
statement possessed ‘circumstantial guarantees of trustworthi89
ness.’” The factors considered in determining “trustworthiness” included age-appropriate knowledge of sexuality, a desire
to not talk about certain body parts, the lack of indication of
deceit in the video, the consistency of the video with the statement given by the victim to the guidance counselor, and the
consistency of the video with the statement that Snider himself
90
gave to the detective.
Snider may not seem to raise a Crawford issue since the
child actually appeared at trial. However, under the Federal
Rules of Evidence, a witness is “unavailable” if that witness
82. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d at 589–90.
83. Id. at 590 (internal quotation marks omitted). This case makes for another interesting comparison. Crawford only requires an opportunity to crossexamine, and does not specify whether it must have been in a setting with the
same burden of proof as the criminal trial. 541 U.S. 36, 59 (2004).
84. State v. Snider, 668 N.W.2d 784, 788 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
85. Id. at 787.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 788 (“Despite leading questions from the prosecution, the victim
left out some of the alleged touching she had described during the taped interview.”).
88. Id. at 791.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 792.
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“testifies to not remembering the subject matter.” Thus, the
witness’s unavailability was arguably analogous to not being
present.
3. California’s Statute
California also has a statute providing for the out-of-court
statements of victims of child abuse or child neglect to be ad92
mitted at trial. For the statement to be admitted, the court
must find “in a hearing conducted outside the presence of the
jury, that the time, content, and circumstances of the state93
ment provide sufficient indicia of reliability.” Additionally, the
child must either be able to testify or be shown unavailable to
94
testify. In the second instance, there must be some form of
corroborating evidence of the crime to indicate the truthfulness
95
of the statement.
The Court of Appeal for the Sixth District in California ap96
plied this statute in People v. Harless. Robert Harless appealed his conviction for lewd acts on children under fourteen
97
as well as sexual assault on children under fourteen. Included
in the evidence against Harless were out-of-court statements
made to a social worker by one of the victims in an interview
98
arranged by a detective. Harless argued that those statements
were inadmissible under Crawford because the witness was
99
unable to remember what she had said or to whom she had
said it, so he did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross100
examine her. An opportunity to conduct “meaningful” cross101
examination is guaranteed by the Confrontation Clause. The
court held that use of the prior inconsistent statement was
proper because the witness’s inability to recall every detail did

91. FED. R. EVID. 804(a)(3).
92. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a) (West Supp. 2014).
93. Id. § 1360(a)(2).
94. Id. § 1360(a)(3).
95. Id.
96. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625 (Ct. App. 2004).
97. Id. at 628.
98. Id. at 631.
99. Making the witness “unavailable” under Federal Rule of Evidence
804(a)(3).
100. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636.
101. See United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (showing that
certain circumstances can “undermine the process” of cross-examination, rendering it not meaningful).
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not render the cross-examination ineffective. Further, since
the witness was present, there was nothing improper about impeaching her in-court testimony with prior out-of-court incon103
sistent statements.
D. ROLE OF THE JURY
Another issue that must be considered when assessing the
permissibility of statutes allowing for out-of-court testimony is
the role of the jury. As has been discussed, the state statutes
call for courts to look to the circumstances surrounding out-ofcourt statements by young victims and assess their reliabil104
ity. In Crawford, Justice Scalia felt that judges were usurping the role of the jury by making their own judgments about
“indicia of reliability” when he compared the use of the stand105
ard to eliminating jury trials in their entirety.
The role of the jury when assessing witness statements, according to the Eighth Circuit’s Model Criminal Jury Instruc106
tions, is to determine the credibility of that testimony. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit examined the application of these jury instructions in a pre-Crawford decision in
107
United States v. Butler, in which Carl Butler appealed his
108
conviction of aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. The child
109
victim-witness testified against Butler in the jury trial.
The trial court issued this jury instruction: “In deciding what
the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and what testimony you do not believe. You may
believe all of what a witness said, or only part of it, or none of
110
it.” The appellate court also approved the trial court’s use of
the following jury instruction:
[Y]ou are the sole judge of the credibility of a child who testifies.
You may consider not only the child’s age, but . . . whether the child
impresses you as having an accurate memory and recollection,

102. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 636–37.
103. Id.
104. Supra Part I.C.1–3.
105. Supra note 26.
106. EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04 (“In deciding what the
facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of what a witness said, or only
part of it, or none of it.”).
107. United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941 (8th Cir. 1995).
108. Id. at 942–43.
109. Id. at 943.
110. Id. at 945 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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whether the child impresses you as a truth-telling individual, and any
other facts and circumstances which impress you as significant in de111
termining the credibility of the child.

Butler argued that the special instruction regarding the childwitness lent extra credence to the testimony, thereby unfairly
112
“bolstering the credibility of the child-witness in this case.”
The appellate court held that the trial court did not give any
undue credence to the child’s testimony, but simply correctly
pointed out that the child’s testimony deserved the same consideration as other testimony and that the jury should deter113
mine the witness’s credibility.
The Minnesota District Judges Association took a similar
stance on the role of the jury when it stated in its jury instructions that “[y]ou are the sole judges of whether a witness is to
be believed and of the weight to be given to a witness’s testi114
mony.”
The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Confrontation
Clause has evolved with the Crawford decision erasing decades
of jurisprudence under the Roberts standard. Many states allow
out-of-court statements into evidence against criminal defendants under statutes that were held constitutional under the
Roberts standard. However, the Crawford decision calls for
reexamination of those statutes.
II. THE STATE STATUTES ARE INCONSISTENT WITH
EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE
As this Part will show, these statutes are not without controversy. Section A will show that the statements allowed under these statutes are, in fact, testimonial. Section B demonstrates that the statutes fail to provide an opportunity for
meaningful cross-examination. Section C will argue that the
statutes do not require a showing of unavailability. Section D
will show that these statutes rely on the now obsolete Roberts
standard. Finally, Section E will argue that the statutes allow
judges to improperly invade the province of the jury.

111. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id.
113. Id. at 945–46.
114. MINNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTIONS GUIDES, CRIMINAL 3.12 (Minn. Dist.
Judges Ass’n, 5th ed. 2006); see also JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL JURY INSTRUCTIONS No. 105 (Jud. Council of Cal. 2013) (“You are the sole
judges of the believability of a witness and the weight to be given to the testimony of each witness.”).
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A. THE TYPES OF STATEMENTS THAT THESE STATUTES ALLOW
ARE TESTIMONIAL
In order to trigger a Crawford analysis, the statements at
115
issue must be testimonial. The three categories of “testimonial” that Crawford laid out included (1) ex parte in-court testimony, (2) formalized extrajudicial statements, and (3) state116
ments made to be a substitute for in-court testimony.
Initially, it would seem child-victim statements do not apply to
any of the three categories. They are neither ex parte in-court
testimony nor are they formalized extrajudicial statements.
For the third category, Crawford looks at the intent of the
witness to determine whether a statement was given for the
117
purpose of creating a substitute for in-court testimony. Since
it is difficult to imagine a child-victim understanding that he is
giving statements for such a substitute, it follows that the third
category also does not apply. However, in the Bryant decision,
it appears that the Court shifted the focus of the primary pur118
pose test from the witness to the questioner. In this instance,
the purpose for gathering the statements is to create a substitute for in-court testimony because the police are searching for
information identifying the attacker with the intention to use it
119
at trial. At least one federal court has determined, without
ruling on the facial validity of the statute, that it is “absolutely
120
clear” that such evidence is testimonial. Given the apparent
evolution in Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, there likely
will be an ongoing conflict as law enforcement and prosecutors
continue using statements of young witnesses obtained during
investigations as a proxy for live testimony.
B. THE STATUTES FAIL TO REQUIRE A MEANINGFUL
OPPORTUNITY FOR CROSS-EXAMINATION
Having established that hearsay is in fact testimonial,
Crawford and its progeny will not allow admission of the
statements unless the state can show both that (1) the witness
115. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 51 (2004) (“[The Confrontation Clause] applies to ‘witnesses’ against the accused—in other words, those
who ‘bear testimony.’”).
116. Id. at 51–52.
117. See id. at 52.
118. See Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1154–55 (2011).
119. See supra Part I.C (detailing state statutes permitting substitutes for
in-court testimony).
120. See Bobadilla v. Carlson, 570 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1104 (D. Minn. 2008).
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is unavailable and (2) that there was a prior opportunity for
121
cross-examination.
The Minnesota and California statutes
seem to violate the fundamental right of cross-examination by
allowing the admission of testimonial hearsay without requiring the witness to testify, so long as there is corroboration of
122
the act and the witness is unavailable. The Wisconsin statute
123
complies with the requirement for cross-examination facially,
but it arguably does not comply with the requirement substantively.
State v. Snider provides an interesting example of how
Wisconsin’s cross-examination requirement may be entirely
cosmetic and not provide a defendant a true opportunity to con124
front the witness against him. In that case, the prosecutor
decided to play the taped victim’s taped statement only after
she was unable to recall the specific details that she had re125
ported on the tape. The defendant can hardly be said to have
had an opportunity to cross-examine the witness when the witness was unable to recall the details admitted as evidence in
the taped statement. In such a circumstance, the defendant is
unable to make the witness answer for any inconsistencies or
flaws in her story because the witness is able to simply assert
lack of memory and allow the tape to stand as uncontroverted
evidence.
Since these statutes do not provide criminal defendants
with a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses
against them, they fail to comply with the Confrontation
Clause.
C. THE STATUTES DON’T REQUIRE A SHOWING OF
UNAVAILABILITY
Crawford and its progeny are predicated not only on the
notion that the out-of-court statement must be testimonial in
nature, but also on the notion that the declarant must be unavailable to testify and must have undergone cross-

121. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
122. See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3 (2013). But corroboration does nothing to satisfy the fundamental right of cross-examination. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69.
123. See WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012) (stating that a court “may admit into
evidence the . . . recording . . . of a child who is available to testify”).
124. State v. Snider, 668 N.W.2d 784 (Wis. Ct. App. 2003).
125. Id. at 788.
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126

examination. As noted above, the Minnesota and California
statutes use the disjunctive, requiring either unavailability or
cross-examination, so that, in the event that the victim has
been cross-examined, unavailability is not required under the
127
statutes. Furthermore, the Wisconsin Court of Appeals ruled
that the Wisconsin statute is an example of a hearsay exception
that allows for admission of hearsay despite the availability of
128
the declarant. It is self-evident that the defendant was unable to cross-examine the videotape in Snider. If the child was
unable to recall the details played on tape, then the defendant
also did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
129
the declarant. That issue was raised and defeated in People v.
Harless since the child was physically present in the court130
room. However, the United States Supreme Court would likely disagree that a child unable to discuss the details being
played on tape could be meaningfully cross-examined because
the defendant lacks an opportunity to confront the witness with
any logical inconsistencies in the testimony.
D. INAPPROPRIATENESS OF THE COURT DETERMINING THE
“INDICIA-OF-RELIABILITY”: SHADES OF ROBERTS
In addition to the Confrontation Clause problems inherent
in the state statutes, the statutes also improperly imbue judges
with the authority to make credibility determinations that
should be made by the jury. This is not necessarily a constitutional concern, but rather a problem that implicates a fundamental component of the jury system.
131
All three of the statutes examined contain similar criteria for what the judge should consider in order to determine
whether out-of-court statements should be admitted. They all
empower the judge to look to the “time, content, and circum126. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
127. Supra Part II.B.
128. See State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582, 589 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
129. Ironically, the child’s inability to recall the details of her attack, while
dooming the admissibility of the evidence by failing the “cross-examination”
prong of the Crawford test, potentially simultaneously satisfies the “unavailability” prong of the test because under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a witness unable to recall sufficient details can be deemed to be “unavailable.” FED.
R. EVID. 804(a)(3) (stating that a witness is unavailable if the witness testifies
to “not remembering the subject matter”); see also United States v. Owens, 484
U.S. 554, 562 (1988) (showing that certain circumstances can “undermine the
process” of cross-examination, rendering it less than meaningful).
130. People v. Harless, 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 625, 636–37 (Ct. App. 2004).
131. Supra Part I.C.
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stances” of the statements in order to determine whether the
132
statements bear an “indicia of reliability,” meaning the judge
is weighing the credibility of the statements. Some might argue
that the Federal Rules of Evidence allow these determina133
tions. However, this type of language seems to be predicated
on the rejected Roberts framework. In fact, the “indicia of reliability” language found in the statutes is essentially the same
134
language used in Roberts
yet specifically rejected in the
135
Crawford decision.
E. INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY
136

Weighing of credibility is the role of the jury. Under
Crawford, the jury’s ability to observe the witness under crossexamination is the only legitimate method of assessing witness
137
credibility. Indeed, the Eighth Circuit upheld the propriety of
an instruction telling the jury that it weighs the credibility of
witnesses and approved an extra instruction saying that the jury alone was responsible for making that credibility determina138
tion, even in the case of child-witnesses. When judges start
making these determinations, they improperly invade the province of the jury and undermine a bedrock principle of the criminal justice system.
A brief hypothetical illustrates the problems inherent in allowing judges to substitute their judgment for that of the jury
when making credibility determinations of witness statements.
Assume a situation where a child reluctantly gave a recorded
132. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3(a) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012).
133. See FED. R. EVID. 807 (requiring “equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness”).
134. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 66 (1980).
135. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004) (“[W]e decline to mine
the record in search of indicia of reliability.”).
136. See, e.g., EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04 (“In deciding
what the facts are, you may have to decide what testimony you believe and
what testimony you do not believe. You may believe all of what a witness said,
or only part of it, or none of it.”) (emphasis added).
137. See Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68–69 (“Where testimonial statements are
at issue, the only indicium of reliability sufficient to satisfy constitutional demands is the one the Constitution actually prescribes: confrontation.”).
138. See United States v. Butler, 56 F.3d 941, 945 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[Y]ou
are the sole judge of the credibility of a child who testifies. You may consider
not only the child’s age, but . . . whether the child impresses you as having an
accurate memory and recollection, whether the child impresses you as a truthtelling individual, and any other facts and circumstances which impress you
as significant in determining the credibility of the child.”).
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statement regarding an alleged sexual assault. The child might
be reluctant because he or she is ashamed and confused about
what happened. On the other hand, the child may have fabricated the event for some reason and now does not want to continue lying. When considering the reliability of the statement,
the judge would have to weigh both of these possibilities before
reaching a decision. However, if the judge decides the statements are reliable, then the possible inference that the child
was reluctant because the story was not true, and the circumstances supporting that inference, are not presented to the jury. The jury then has to make a credibility determination about
the out-of-court testimony without the benefit of all of the relevant information about the circumstances of the statement itself. Reliability cannot realistically be separated from credibility, but that is exactly the scenario that the exemplar statutes,
as currently written, force upon the courts.
This problem can also be seen in Tarantino, where the trial
court actually found that most of the factors it used to assess
139
reliability did not support admitting the statements. However, the court decided to admit them anyway because of the nature of the crime and the close relationship between the victim
and the defendant, and because showing the video would re140
duce the victim’s exposure. Although the statements were
admitted, it was the judge rather than the jury that considered
141
the reliability factors. The jury consequently had to make a
credibility determination without the benefit of direct live tes142
timony.
The statutes discussed in this Note are problematic for a
variety of reasons. They permit testimonial hearsay, fail to require a meaningful opportunity for cross-examination, do not
require a showing of unavailability, rely on an overturned Supreme Court doctrine, and improperly invade the province of
the jury.

139.
140.
141.
142.

State v. Tarantino, 458 N.W.2d 582, 587 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 585.
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III. HOW THE STATUTES COULD BE REDRAFTED
CONSISTENT WITH CURRENT JUDICIAL PRINCIPLES
AND THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
Having demonstrated that the statutes at issue are problematic both from a perspective of Confrontation Clause juris143
prudence as well as when viewed in terms of the traditional
144
role of the jury, this Note next addresses how to revise the
statutes to make them consistent with those principles. Section
A describes how the statutes could be revised to allow for the
use of live, two-way video testimony. Section B proposes that
the statutes could be rewritten to be consistent with the Crawford line of decisions. Section C concludes that the former option would better balance the competing interests in this contentious issue.
A. REWRITE THE CHILD-VICTIM PROTECTION STATUTES TO
SPECIFICALLY ALLOW FOR THE USE OF LIVE TWO-WAY VIDEO
TESTIMONY
The cases and statutes discussed above illustrate constitutional problems inherent in admitting out-of-court statements.
Is there a way to protect the child-victims without depriving
criminal defendants the right to confront their accusers?
Closed-circuit television provides such an alternative. It can allow for cross-examination of a young witness during trial, thus
allowing a jury to see the child testifying and assess the child’s
credibility, while at the same time protecting the child-witness
from having to experience a face-to-face encounter with his or
her alleged assailant.
Minnesota state courts have had opportunities to assess
145
the statute allowing the use of closed-circuit television as a
way to shield child-victims from face-to-face confrontation with
their alleged assailants while still protecting the Confrontation
rights of the accused. In State v. Ross, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals considered a situation where a man was charged with
146
sexual abuse against his girlfriend’s daughter.
There, the
child-victim began her testimony in the courtroom but had to
resume her testimony via two-way video because she became
scared when asked about the defendant while she was in the
143.
144.
145.
146.

Supra Part II.A–C.
Supra Part II.D–E.
MINN. STAT. § 595.02, subdiv. 4(c)(2) (2013).
State v. Ross, 451 N.W.2d 231, 233 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990).
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147

courtroom. The court upheld the use of the video testimony
and said that it did not violate the defendant’s Confrontation
rights because it came with a “particularized finding” that confronting her accuser face to face would cause further trauma to
148
the child.
Other jurisdictions also allow live, two-way video testimony. In 2009, the New York Court of Appeals heard an appeal
from a case where the New York Supreme Court allowed an
adult complainant to testify in an assault case via two-way video because he lived out of state and his health would have
149
made traveling to New York to testify difficult. In that case,
the court upheld the conviction, finding that live, two-way video
testimony upheld testimonial reliability required by the Confrontation Clause because there was “an individualized determination that denial of physical, face-to-face confrontation is
150
necessary to further an important public policy.”
The statutes could be saved from Confrontation Clause violations if, instead of excusing the child from testifying, they instead allowed the child the protection of live two-way video testimony. While such a scheme would not prevent the child from
having to revisit the traumatic experience, it would at least
prevent the child from undergoing the trauma of meeting his or
151
her alleged attacker face to face. At the same time, the defendant would have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
(or “confront”) his or her accuser.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals has ruled that live twoway video testimony does not violate a defendant’s Confronta152
tion rights. However, there is a question whether the Supreme Court would find two-way video testimony to be an appropriate substitute for face-to-face confrontation. In 1988, the
Court overturned a conviction of a man charged with sexually

147. Id. at 233–34.
148. Id. at 235 (ruling that a finding that the child was scared to be in the
presence of the defendant was sufficient to establish that the child would be
traumatized if forced to face her assailant).
149. People v. Wrotten, 923 N.E.2d 1099, 1100 (N.Y. 2009).
150. Id. at 1102 (internal quotation marks omitted).
151. See Julie Oseid, Note, Defendants’ Rights in Child Witness Competency Hearings: Establishing Constitutional Procedures for Sexual Abuse Cases,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1377, 1384–85 (1985) (“[R]etelling the story is like another
assault, because the traumatic incident must constantly be relived and remembered.”).
152. See Ross, 451 N.W.2d at 234–35.
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153

assaulting two thirteen-year-old girls. The trial court com154
mitted reversible error when, pursuant to an Iowa statute, it
allowed the victim-witnesses to testify through a special screen
155
designed to shield them from their alleged assailant. The
Court held that the Confrontation Clause ensured defendants
the right to face-to-face confrontation because a witness would
find it more difficult to lie when that witness has to testify face
156
to face with his or her alleged assailant. However, the Court
did note that one of the factors that weighed against the state
was that the statute presumed child-victims would find facing
their assailants to be a traumatizing experience. The Court indicated an exception to the Confrontation Clause would require
more particularized findings supporting the necessity of the
157
shield. This potentially leaves the door open for courts to allow alternatives to physical face-to-face testimony in the event
of a particularized finding of trauma to the child victimwitness.
So long as such findings were provided for in some kind of
hearing, courts would likely find two-way video testimony to be
an appropriate method of testimony for child victim-witnesses
for several reasons. First, in evaluating the need for two-way
video, the judge would simply be assessing likelihood of trauma
while leaving credibility determinations in the hands of the jury. Additionally, the Coy Court declined to ban outright statutes that provided for shielding of crime victims from their ac158
cusers.
The Supreme Court, however, did articulate the
objectives of the Confrontation Clause as allowing the defendant to look at the witnesses, cross-examine the witnesses, and
159
impeach the witnesses.
Based on those objectives, courts
should be expected to uphold the use of two-way video testimony. Unlike the protective sheet at issue in Coy, live video testimony allows for the defendant and the jury to see the witness.
The defendant’s counsel also has an opportunity to crossexamine the witness, and defense counsel can impeach the wit153. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1988).
154. IOWA CODE ANN. § 910A.14 (West 1987).
155. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1020.
156. Id. at 1019–20.
157. Id. at 1021.
158. Id. Indeed, the Supreme Court did distinguish from Coy a case involving two-way video testimony and found it permissible because it did have particularized findings supporting the important policy of protecting the childvictim susceptible to trauma. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 853 (1990).
159. Coy, 487 U.S. at 1017.
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ness. Therefore, the Supreme Court would likely be more receptive to live, two-way video testimony than it was to protective
sheets.
Critics might argue that by putting children in a two-way
video setup, they are still being placed in a traumatic setting.
To some extent, that cannot be helped. The adversarial system
requires confrontation as a protection of defendants’ rights. Insulating a witness from having to face his or her assailant in a
live setting is as much protection as can be offered without depriving the defendant of one of the Constitution’s protections.
However, by saving these victims from the live setting, the victims are protected by the knowledge that their assailant is only
appearing on a TV screen, and there is no opportunity for direct
physical contact between assailant and victim.
There are several benefits to allowing this form of testimony, which successfully balances the interests of both the accused and the victims of crimes. The defendant would have an
opportunity to test the veracity of the accuser’s claims and be
able to expose any motives for dishonesty. The jury would be
able to gauge the child-witness’s facial expression and tone of
voice to determine whether or not it finds the testimony to be
credible. And, most importantly, it would be the jury making
that determination.
B. LIMITING THE SCOPE OF THE STATUTES TO NONTESTIMONIAL HEARSAY
In addition to providing for a new mechanism for child testimony, legislatures should amend the statutes to apply only to
specific types of out-of-court statements. They should begin by
including the word “non-testimonial” every time they refer to
160
the statements. Since testimonial hearsay is inadmissible,
the statutes would clear one constitutional hurdle if the drafters made it clear that the statutes applied only to nontestimonial hearsay. This would be constitutionally permissible
because courts may freely apply various rules of evidence to
161
hearsay that is non-testimonial. The statutes can draw this
same line between “testimonial” and “non-testimonial” hearsay,
allowing judges to make the more difficult distinction between
the two, and allowing the statutes to evolve in accordance with
the definitions handed down by the Supreme Court.
160. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004).
161. See id. at 61 (“[W]e apply the Confrontation Clause only to testimonial
statements, leaving the remainder to regulation by hearsay law . . . .”).
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Critics might label this approach as unduly formalistic, es162
pecially given the ill-defined concept of “testimonial hearsay.”
Saying that the statutes would only apply to “non-testimonial
statements” would not be appreciably different from saying
that “this statute only applies to situations where it comports
with the Constitution.” Those critics might argue that statutory
language should say that statements made in a formal interview with a police officer, in a police station, or arranged by a
police officer are not admissible. However, given the evolving
nature of Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, it would be more
prudent to simply say “non-testimonial” and allow the statutes
to evolve alongside the case law. These changes would be con163
sistent with Davis’s primary purpose test by preventing the
admission of statements made at the behest of police officers in
the course of their investigation for the purpose of creating admissible evidence. Furthermore, these changes would also sat164
isfy Bullcoming’s formality test by banning statements at settings that the Supreme Court finds to be too formal of a setting
in order for the evidence to be admissible.
Critics might also assert that statements made in order to
create evidence to aid in prosecution or statements that were
responses to questions asked for the same purpose are in viola165
tion of Bryant. They would want the statute to explicitly say
that no statement shall be admitted if an objectively reasonable
person would think it was made for evidentiary use in criminal
prosecution or in response to questions asked for such an evidentiary purpose. This would presumably compel judges to apply the reasonable person standard when making admissibility
decisions rather than trusting trial judges to correctly apply all
of the standards from the convoluted Crawford progeny. However, once again, this would preclude courts from being able to
adjust to the ever-expanding line of cases dealing with Confrontation Clause jurisprudence.
The distinction between testimonial and non-testimonial
statements would be a question of law for the judge to decide,
but the jury should be able to analyze and give weight to any
evidence regarding the reliability of the statements. In order to
166
preserve the proper role of the jury, the statute should re162.
163.
164.
165.
166.

See supra Part I.B.2 (describing various interpretations).
Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822 (2006).
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 131 S. Ct. 2705, 2717 (2011).
Michigan v. Bryant, 131 S. Ct. 1143, 1147–48 (2011).
See EIGHTH CIRCUIT MANUAL, supra note 12, § 3.04.
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quire that the evidence regarding the “time, content, and cir167
cumstances” of the statements be presented to the jury to aid
them in making their credibility determinations. This way, the
judge would not merely inform the jury that the court has determined the statements are reliable because of the circumstances under which they are given. Instead, the jury would be
able to see the same evidence as the judge and use it to either
agree with the court or determine that the statements are not
inherently reliable. Whatever decision the jury makes, this rule
would make the jury the sole judge of how much (if any) weight
to give to the out-of-court statements.
In contrast to objections that the proposed revisions do not
go far enough to comport the statutes with modern Confrontation Clause jurisprudence, other critics might claim the added
restrictions would make it too difficult to admit out-of-court
statements and thus fail to protect vulnerable child-victims.
While these proposals would make it more difficult to prevent
some witnesses from having to take the stand in potentially
traumatic situations, if the statutes are not changed in order to
make them consistent with Crawford, then no victims will be
protected because they will all have to testify in person. Therefore, by limiting the scope of these statutes, legislatures can
continue to protect vulnerable child-victims while not running
afoul of the Confrontation Clause.
C. THE PREFERRED SOLUTION
Considering both live, two-way video testimony and rewriting the statutes to limit their scope, the better solution would
be to amend the statutes to allow for live, two-way video testimony. The expansive definitions offered by Crawford and its
progeny of what makes hearsay evidence “testimonial” would
result in only a small amount of hearsay being admitted under
the revised statutes. Therefore, prosecutors would frequently
be left with the Hobson’s choice between putting the childvictim on the stand to face their alleged attacker or trying to
prosecute without the evidence. Allowing for live, two-way video testimony would prevent them from having to face that
choice.
Advocates of the revisions limiting the scope of the statutes
to non-testimonial hearsay might argue that live testimony
167. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1360(a)(3) (West Supp. 2014); MINN. STAT.
§ 595.02, subdiv. 3(a) (2013); WIS. STAT. § 908.08(1) (2012).
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would be preferable to testimony on a video screen. Prosecutors
likely would not disagree. This solution, however, does not
mean that child-witnesses must testify through two-way video.
Rather, it is simply an option if the prosecutor feels the child is
not emotionally strong enough to testify in person. If the child
is willing and able to testify live, that can be done—and will
likely be more powerful testimony. But, if the prosecutor did
not feel that was the case, prosecutors would have the added
option of using closed-circuit television in order to balance the
prosecutorial interests with the protection of vulnerable victims. Giving prosecutors that ability to balance their prosecutorial interests with the need to protect the child-victims would
help ensure that both interests are adequately protected.
CONCLUSION
To protect child-victims of heinous crimes, many states
have laws allowing those children to have out-of-court statements admitted against their alleged assailants in criminal trials. While the objective of these statutes is a noble one, it also
disturbs the Confrontation rights of the defendants and impermissibly inserts judges into a credibility-weighing role ordinarily reserved for juries. It is important for legislatures, in
their haste to protect sympathetic victims, not to forget that
our criminal justice system also owes an important obligation
to unsympathetic defendants.
If states wanted to keep the children from having to testify
at all, they could attempt to rewrite the statutes to be consistent with Crawford and its progeny. However, the use of
two-way video testimony to save children the trauma of face-toface confrontation would most effectively preserve the Confrontation rights of the accused while still protecting those children.

